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Abstract 
 
The recent global recession requires policy makers to identify the relative importance of shock 
transmission mechanisms in each region and devise counter policy measures against future 
idiosyncratic shocks. In the last decade, world dynamics have changed considerably due to increased 
openness and integration requiring considering business cycles at regional levels. This paper analyzes 
the business cycle movements of the EU, ASEAN+3, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and SAARC regions to 
investigate why the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007 did not spread globally compared to the crisis 
that began with the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Employing a Panel Vector 
Autoregressive framework (PVEC), this study finds that the subprime mortgage crisis shock 
originated in the real sector (falling US housing prices) and was transmitted through trade variables. 
Due to absence of short term trade variables transmission mechanism in all regions except the 
MERCOSUR and SAARC, the shock did not spread widely to other regions. Even in the 
MERCOSUR and SAARC, due to limited goods exports exposure to the US, the shock was not 
significant. Resultantly, these regions exhibited a decoupling phenomenon during the subprime 
mortgage crisis. In contrast, the second shock originated with the fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and 
was transmitted through financial variables. Due to the presence of the short term causal relationship 
of the financial variable with GDP in all regions except SAARC, the slowdown contagion spread to 
most regions.  As a result, the slowdown triggered the trade variables shock transmission mechanism 
and the SAARC region was also affected. Consequently, a business cycle convergence phenomenon 
was observed in the regions. Therefore, business cycles decoupling and convergence phenomena in 
the regions depend not only on the origin of the shock but also on the relative importance of the 
transmission mechanisms in each region.    
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1 Introduction 
 
 
The increased openness and integration across nations whether through trade liberalization or 
financial integration has changed world dynamics. Regional blocks are growing and new players have 
risen including China and India.  The share of intraregional trade in world trade is more than the share 
of interregional trade. Europe’s intraregional trade is growing faster than its external trade while in the 
ASEAN+3, it accounts for almost half its total trade. While MERCOSUR and SAARC have seen 
higher growth in their inter-regional exports compared to 2000, except for MERCOSUR, all major 
regions namely, EU, ASEAN+3, NAFTA and SAARC export exposure to the US has declined. Even 
for MERCOSUR, the proportion is not more than 20 per cent (Figure 1, Appendix). Moreover, the 
most significant development in the world arena was the accession of China to the WTO in 2001. 
Since its accession, China has increased its exports almost four times while its imports have increased 
three times. Some 45 per cent of its trade receipts stem from Asia while the US and European Union 
account for 21 per cent of its exports (WTO 2008). Given the increasing globalization, economies 
have enhanced their integration regionally and globally. 
 
In this context, if economic turbulence  originates from idiosyncratic shocks, so far, most research has 
focused on exploring whether other countries or regions are decoupled from the shock or not. 
However, if the disturbance is global and systemic in nature, affecting all countries at the same time, 
the studies focus on examining correlations among the macroeconomic variables at country or 
regional levels. In case of idiosyncratic shocks, the studies focus on observing the business cycle 
movements of countries or regions to the business cycle of the crisis affected country or region. If 
there is co-movement in the business cycles, then the countries or regions are said to have 
convergence in their business cycles. If not, then countries or regions business cycles are said to be 
decoupled. By focusing on outcomes and not considering transmission mechanisms, the task of 
designing policy for dampening the effect of shocks on a country or region’s output becomes 
cumbersome. 
 
Despite consensus on the spill over determinants of the business cycles that include: trade integration, 
financial integration, exchange rate, remittances, commodity prices and fiscal convergence, ambiguity 
persists on the spillover impact of these determinants on business cycle synchronization. 
Nevertheless, the interesting question is why the idiosyncratic shock that originated in the US in 2007 
due to the subprime mortgage crisis (falling US housing prices), did not result in economic down 
turns in other regions compared to the US specific shock of 2008 that started with the fall of Lehman 
Brothers and later translated itself into global financial crisis despite the presence of the same 
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transmission mechanism. There may be plausible explanations regarding the spread of the shock to 
other regions, we hypothesize that in the case of idiosyncratic shocks, all spillover determinants of 
business cycles may not be relevant at the same time. Rather, the spread of contagion may depend on 
the origin and nature of the shock, relative importance of the transmission mechanisms and specific 
characteristics of each region or country due to the interplay of integration forces such as production 
networks1. To explore this, we identify the relative importance of shock propagation channels in each 
region and test the empirical findings for each region by observing the regions responses to the 
idiosyncratic shocks of 2007 and 2008.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of previous 
studies while Section 3 sets out the methodological framework. The data sources are dealt in Section 
4. Section 5 presents test results for panel unit root and panel cointegration and also traces causality 
and mechanism among macroeconomic variables. Section 6 provides a discussion on the results  of 
the paper  and  Section 7 concludes . 
 
 
2 Literature review 
 
Apart from other explanations, we investigate, at the regional level, whether out of all the shock 
transmission channels, namely, trade integration, financial integration, exchange rate, remittances, 
commodity prices and fiscal convergence, there are any specific channels that behave like an Achilles 
heel for each region under different crisis scenarios. For example, the relative importance of each 
transmission mechanism during subprime mortgage crisis shock of August 2007 (falling US housing 
prices) and the shock generated with the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Due to different 
origins of shocks, knowing the relative importance of each channel would tell us about the special 
characteristics of each region (production networks) and also throw light on why the regions behaved 
differently to the idiosyncratic shocks of 2007 and 2008. 
 
In the literature, there is theoretical agreement on the factors that cause movements in business cycles. 
However, there is no consensus on the role of these factors (channels) in bringing about convergence 
or decoupling among countries or regions business cycles. This is important because apart from the 
domestic determinants of growth such as human capital, there are exogenous channels for example 
FDI, exports and imports  that  contribute towards growth and also act in the same manner as growth 
destabilizing factors such as in times of crises. 
                                                 
1
 However, the regional propagation dynamics may be different from the country specific channels and therefore 
regional and countries decoupling outcomes could be different. 
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Agreement is lacking among empirical theorists on the impact of international trade linkages on 
business cycles. Closer trade ties could result in either a tighter or looser correlation of business cycles 
and there will be output correlations among trading partners trading intensively (Frankel & Rose 
1998; Baxter & Kouparitsas 2005). Kenen (2000) using a Keynesian model and Kose and Yi (2006) 
in the international business cycle model conclude a positive relationship between trade and output. 
Imbs (2004) finds a sizeable impact of intraindustry trade on bilateral correlations compared to the 
smaller inter-industry trade impact. Empirical findings also show common business cycles for the 
East Asian region (Sato & Zhang 2006). Shin and Sohn (2006), Rana (2006, 2007) find trade as an 
important determinant of business cycle synchronizations. Kumakura (2006) finds the increasing 
share of electronic products in foreign trade as a reason for business cycle co movements for Pacific 
countries while Hallet and Richeter (2008) find declining importance of the US for Asia. Arndt (2006) 
argues that intra industry trade in countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) was intra-
industry in nature but different from production sharing as the former involved the two directional 
flows of finished varieties. Therefore, production sharing under a preferential trading arrangement 
(PTA) would be trade creating and reduce asymmetries between countries, resulting in cyclical 
convergence. However, the opposing view suggests that trade integration leads to more specialization 
based on comparative advantage in the production of goods. Consequently, the importance of 
asymmetric or sector specific shocks increases with economic integration leading to idiosyncratic 
business cycles (Krugman 1993). Hence consensus is lacking among theorists. 
 
Financial integration also presents ambiguous theoretical support for its impact on business cycle 
synchronization. Imbs (2004, 2006), Inklaar et al. (2008) and Kose et al. (2003) find a positive 
correlation between financial integration and business cycle co-movements. However, this 
relationship is weak in developing countries due to a plunge in stock markets distributing negative 
wealth effects for asset holders around the world. Bordo and Helbling (2004) find no significant effect 
of financial integration. Conversely, international diversification of portfolios may allow consumption 
smoothening due to risk sharing that may not require diversification in production bases and may lead 
to greater specialization and less co-movements in business cycles (Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 2001). Kose 
et al. (2008) find evidence for convergence of business cycle within OECD countries and emerging 
countries but suggest decoupling of business cycles between these two groups. Fidrmuc et al. (2009) 
also find little correlation between business cycle frequencies of India and China with the  OECD. 
Again, we observe ambiguous theoretical support for the role of financial integration in bringing 
about business cycle synchronization. 
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Regarding exchange rate volatility, Leung (1997) argues that empirical evidence has failed to show 
any systematic link between short-term exchange rate volatility and the volume of bilateral and 
multilateral trade. However she further suggests that patterns of trade could be affected by exchange 
rate volatility: that currency invoicing of trade matters and currency hedging provides a reasonably 
cost effective way of managing exchange rate volatility. McKinnon (2000) comments on the East 
Asian currency standards by considering the financial depth in these countries. He argues that while a 
common monetary standard is not as good as a common currency, however, it is preferable among 
close trading partners compared to (unrestricted) exchange rate flexibility.  Similarly, Mundell (2000) 
argues that free trade areas and currency areas reinforce each other. Using a gravity equation, Rose 
(2000), Glick and Rose (2002), Micco et al. (2003) and Baldwin (2006) find currency unions raise 
bilateral trade. However, Lane and Milesi-ferretti (2007) and Cappiello et al. (2006) show greater 
financial integration as a result of Euro introduction. Co-movements of business cycles can also occur 
when a country pegs its exchange rate (Patnaik et al. 2007). We witness diverging views regarding 
exchange rate volatility and its impact on business cycles. 
 
Carry trade can also be used as a speculative vehicle to transmit shocks and bring co-movements in 
other regions. The World Bank Global Development Finance report (2009) estimates the volume of 
carry trade between US$200 billion and US$1 trillion. The report suggests that carry   trades keep 
high-yielding currencies such as the Indonesian rupee, Mexican peso, South African rand, and 
Brazilian real at relatively high appreciated levels. However, during the global financial crisis, sudden 
withdrawals from affected countries led to rapid currency depreciations as investors sought safe 
havens in U.S. Treasury securities. Estimates of recent losses by emerging market corporations from 
their foreign exchange positions exceed US$40 billion, with perhaps the largest losses in Brazil 
(where some 200 firms incurred losses of an estimated US$28 billion, according to Marques and 
Moutinho 2008), Poland (where authorities estimate total losses at US$5 billion), and the Republic of 
Korea (where the government had spent US$1.3 billion by January 2009 to stave off bankruptcies of 
firms with derivative losses) (GDF 2009). 
 
Fiscal convergence could also lead to business cycle co-movements because of lowering country 
specific shocks. (Inklaar et al. 2008;  Darvas et al. 2005). In the current crisis, the World Bank is of 
the view that stimulating aggregate demand would be helpful but countries would be reluctant to do 
this due to its spillover effects to other countries. However, if a country such as the US does this 
alone, investors will lose confidence in its fiscal sustainability and withdraw financing. These 
constraints can be handled through global commitment to coordinated action of fiscal expansion 
(GDF 2009). The World Bank GDF report (2009) also mentions commodity prices and remittances as 
other channels affecting   business cycle co-movements. Commodities prices affect the business 
cycles because a fall in consumer demand results also in a fall in commodities demand due to a cut in 
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investment and consumption decisions. Therefore, countries highly dependent on commodity exports 
are affected while in other countries, it may help to buffer the adverse impacts due to improvement in 
the current account because of a fall in commodity prices. Furthermore, a number of Latin American 
and Central American countries depended on workers remittances from the US and due to the crisis, 
would be hit hard, as remittances account for a significant share of GDP. Declining remittances will 
have marked consequences for private consumption and investment. In addition to FDI and other 
sources;   the US, Europe and UAE have become important sources of financing through remittances 
for developing countries of the region. The dampening of income and investment flows is likely to 
slow down growth in certain regions (GDF 2009). 
Regarding special characteristics of each region, for example in the ASEAN+3, the global value-chain 
and production networks are different from those in Europe. According to Gill et al. (2007), 
production networks have more extensive spread in East Asia than other regions. Gill et al. (2007) 
suggest the spread is due to regionalism and regionalization and note that low trade barriers, a 
efficient duty drawback regime for exports, encouragement of export oriented FDI, good logistics and 
wage differentials in the country are the result of regionalism. Furthermore, proximity to production 
networks, scale economies and other agglomeration economies that effect cost structure of 
intermediate inputs is mainly due to regionalization.  Because of these processes, the economies 
become closely integrated and one country’s income growth generates demands for parts and 
components in other countries in the value-supply chain. Ando and Kimura (2003) describe the 
production networks in East Asia as vertical intra-industry trade phenomena that involve back and 
forth links where several countries participate in various stages of single production chains compared 
to the horizontal intra-industry trade pattern in Europe. The European intra-industry trade model 
involves bi-directional flows of finished goods varieties. Kimura et al. (2007) further find the vertical 
intra industry trade in East Asia that unit prices of exports and imports differ widely. In addition, 
Krugman (1980) and Helpman and Krugman’s (1985) well established model of intra industry trade is 
based on horizontal product differentiation and fits the mechanics of intra industry trade among 
developed countries such as the core EU countries. The fragmentation theory initiated by Jones and 
Kierzkowski (1990) explains the structure of production networks in East Asia. 
 
Gill et al. (2007) assert that East Asia first integrated globally and is now increasing its share 
regionally. Comparative intra regional trade pattern are shown in Figure 1 (Appendix) demonstrating 
that intra regional trade was more developed in the regions where intra industry trade was 
predominant such as East Asia and the EU. Gill et al. (2007) further argue that production networks 
require low cost, long term financing for capital investment and short term working capital for 
financing trade. Moreover, production networks are exposed to currency risk when the cost structure 
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of different components is dependent on local currency wages and credit risk and the network 
comprises a large and diverse number of companies governed by different contractual agreements. 
 
In order to find convergence or decoupling phenomenon in regions with the business cycle of the 
crisis originating country, we employ a Panel Vector Error Correction (PVEC) framework to explore 
the short and long term transmission channels in the regions. To our knowledge, this methodology has 
not been employed so far to investigate the convergence or decoupling in regions to idiosyncratic 
shocks. However, our focus will be on the short run dynamics active in each region. We draw on the 
basic income equation and separate the financial flows (financial integration) from real economy 
variables such as goods exports and services exports (trade integration) and find their short and long 
term affects on growth. We do not consider imports in a regional framework due to the presence of 
intra industry trade phenomena and one country imports are reflected in other countries exports.  
 
We consider the growth equation with its external factors only because crisis is transmitted through 
them. In the manner external factors contribute in regions growth, the same way they decelerate 
growth. So the basic framework isolates the external factors impact on the regions business cycles in 
the short and long term by employing PVEC. To differentiate among the external factors, we draw on 
the national income identity for an open economy which is 
 
 Y = C + I + G + Exp – Imp   (1) 
Also 
 Y = C + S + G     (2) 
Equations (1) and (2) yields 
S = I + Exp – Imp  
NCO = Net Capital outflow= Net Exports = NX   (3) 
   
NX represents difference between exports and imports of goods and services. Liberalization of the 
capital account due to financial integration enables the free flow of capital. Besides official inflows, 
capital account flows include long term private capital flows in the form of FDI flows and private 
short term inflows in the form of portfolio equity flows and private creditors that include bond and 
short term debt flows. The literature lacks consensus on the growth promoting aspects of capital 
account liberalization. For example, Bhagwati (1998) and Rodrik (1998) found evidence against the 
growth promoting aspects of capital account liberalization while Borensztein et al. (1998) found 
positive evidence between FDI and growth. The World Bank Global Development Finance report 
(2001) also finds that private capital flows raise domestic investment. This association is stronger in 
Africa compared to East Asia and the Pacific or in Latin America and the Caribbean. Furthermore, the 
World Bank GDF report (2001) notes that capital flows volatility significantly dampens economic 
 9
growth and its impact was visible in the form of output and consumption shocks in East Asian 
countries in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1990s.  
 
Based on above discussions, four external channels namely long term FDI, short term foreign equity 
and creditors’ flows of world financial markets and goods and services exports in markets for goods 
and services influence economic growth. In order to answer why the subprime mortgage crisis did not 
spread to other regions compared to the global financial crisis that started with the fall of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008, we need to analyze the effect of FDI, short term capital flows, services 
and goods exports on regions GDP in the short run and long run in a PVEC framework. However, we 
consider only FDI, goods and services exports in our empirical analysis due to unavailability of long 
time series data on short term capital flows. As our model in equation 3 shows that only four external 
factors can affect economic growth and if we know the relationships of three factors, any other 
unusual behaviour in GDP can be attributed to the fourth factor which is short term capital flows. 
Following this methodology, we do our empirical analysis in a PVEC framework. 
 
In the literature we observe reverse causality among GDP, FDI, services exports and goods exports 
For example, we find a growth promoting role of FDI (Somwaru & Makki 2004; Easterly et al. 1995; 
Yanruni Wu 1999; Findlay 1978) and a negative effect on GDP growth due to a FDI crowding out 
effect (Charkovic & Levine 2005). Similarly, causality can be other way round as the market seeking 
FDI serves growing economies. There is also a two way causality discussion between exports and 
GDP growth such as the export led growth hypothesis (Somwaru & Makki 2004; Grossman & 
Helpman 1991) on one hand while GDP growth leads to export growth argument on the other hand 
(Jing & Marshal 1983). However, Rodrik (1995) and Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) are critical of this 
relationship. On the relationship between FDI and exports, the economic literature (Petri & Plummer 
1998; Gray 1998; Kjima 1973; Vernon 1966; Hsiao & Hsiao 2006; We, Wang & Liu 2001; Helpman, 
1984; Helpman & Krugman 1985; UNCTAD 1996) highlights the bidirectional relationship between 
these variables. We take care of the reverse causality issue by estimating four equations, one for each 
variable. In addition, the effects of exchange rate changes can be reflected in the export figures and 
financial flows. 
 
Private capital flows affect growth through three channels, namely, financial intermediation, bond 
markets and stock markets. The level of financial sector development can play an important role in 
growth through mobilization of savings, pooling of resources and risk, efficient allocation of 
resources, overcoming asymmetric information, and encouraging specialization in production bases 
and facilitating exchange of goods and services. The roles of other private capital flow channels, 
namely, the stock and bond markets on economic growth have also been considered empirically. 
Aretis et al. (2001) find from analysis of five developed countries that banks and stock markets 
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promote growth but banks are more important. Fink et al. (2004) analyze the role of three financial 
segments on growth by comparing a group of 18 developed countries and nine EU accession countries 
and find that transfer mechanisms for growth differ over the development cycle. They argue that 
domestic credit, real capital stocks along with bond markets stimulate growth in early transition while 
education attainment replaces domestic credit in the next stage. In the case of developed countries, 
none of the financial variables played a role in growth except labour participation, real capital stock 
and educational attainment.  
 
However, the growth promoting aspect of capital flows have critics due to the presence of distortions 
in the financial system. It is assumed that capital flows to a country in search of investment 
opportunities and capital markets allocate resources efficiently in search of these opportunities. This 
role of capital flows has faced criticism from some economists such as McKinnon and Pill (1997). 
They point towards investors over borrowing due to overly optimism leading to the financial crisis, 
Dooley (1994) argues government guarantees rather than investment opportunities are the main 
reason. Powell (1998) highlights various forms of government guarantees such as fixed or quasi fixed 
exchange rates and domestic and international guarantees for financial support. Similarly Krugman 
(1998) and Corsetti et al. (1998) emphasize moral hazard arising due to government guarantees that 
results in channeling of capital flows into speculative investments. They conclude that the resultant 
speculative investments may not generate positive externalities in the economy and capital flows 
would lead to growth only if it results in productive investments that lead to positive spillovers in the 
real or financial sector of the economy. 
 
The literature also tells us about output co-movements across various countries and regions. Kose et 
al. (2008) note differences in country coverage, sample period, aggregation methods for creating 
country groups and different econometric methods could lead to different conclusions and business 
cycle co-movements. For example, some empirical researchers find declining business cycle co-
movements such as between US and other G-7 countries (Helbling & Bayoumi 2002); US and 
aggregate of Europe, Canada and Japan ( Heathcote & Perri 2004); G-7 countries (Stock & Watson 
2005); European countries (Kose et al. 2003a). However in contrast, some studies find strengthening 
of business cycle co-movements such as  between individual countries aggregates and G-7 aggregates, 
(Kose et al. 2003 b); across industrialized countries (Bordo & Helbling 2003). Similarly, Hecq, Palm, 
and Urbain (2005) find output co movements among five Latin American countries , Brazil, 
Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Chile. For NAFTA economies, Kose et al. (2004) find increase in 
business cycle co-movements in the last decade. Fidrmuc et al. (2008) favored decoupling hypothesis 
between OECD countries business cycles and India and China. Fidrmuc (2004) and Artis et al. (2008) 
find intra industry trade a better indicator for business cycle asymmetries than simple trade intensities. 
Sato and Zhang (2006) find common business cycles for East Asia. Hughes Hallet and Richter (2008) 
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observe decoupling of the US business cycle from Asia. Kose et al. (2008) find convergence of 
business cycles in OECD countries and emerging countries while decoupling evidence between the 
two groups. 
 
 
3 Methodology 
 
During the past two decades, linkages across countries at the regional level as well as across regions 
have transformed. Apart from bilateral and multilateral forces, the emergence of regional blocks and 
the resultant intra industry trade phenomena has been important in transforming the structure of 
economies at regional levels. Hence, the response of countries and regions to idiosyncratic shocks will 
be different. In view of the integration forces at work and to answer our question, we analyze 
separately the likely impact of the shock propagation mechanism on regional blocks business cycles. 
As the shocks under consideration are idiosyncratic having US origin and by knowing national 
income identity, we realize that shocks can spread to other regions through trade and financial 
variables affecting business cycles around the globe. Among trade variables, we consider services and 
goods exports due to the presence of intra industry trade in most regions and do not include imports 
figures as these are reflected in the export figures of trading partners. For financial variables, we 
include FDI only in analysis due to availability of long time series data on it. We do not consider 
exchange rate due to the prevalence of varying exchange rate regimes and their different behaviour to 
shocks but most importantly, the effect of exchange rate movement could be reflected in the trade and 
financial variables. Similarly we do not consider the impact of commodity prices as its effects could 
be reflected in the trade variables and deflating the macroeconomic variable would take care of the 
resultant price effect.   
 
Drawing on the analogy of the income equation, we identify the likely short term and long term 
impact of goods and services exports along with FDI on the regions GDP. The idea is that these 
external factors contribute to growth and similarly, these variables would decelerate growth under any 
idiosyncratic negative shock. Therefore, if we identify these variables impact both in the short as well 
as long term, then we could answer our question of why the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007 did not 
become the global financial crisis compared to the crisis that started with the fall of Lehman Brothers 
in September 2008 despite having a common origin. In addition, analyzing the regional grouping 
would help to take care of the integration forces at work, mainly due to the presence of intra industry 
trade phenomena. However, the regional propagation dynamics may be different from the country 
specific channels and therefore regional and countries decoupling outcomes could be different. 
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Different methodologies have been adopted for finding co-movements of business cycles. These 
include dynamic correlations (Croux et al. 2001; Fidrmuc et al. 2008), dynamic factor models (Kose 
et al. 2008; Gregory et al. 1997) which focus on the outcome. This study differentiates the 
transmission channels and is interested in the relative importance of these channels in the   the regions 
GDP. Temple (1999) while presenting cross section growth regressions as the most popular method 
among economists highlights problems with the approach such as parameter heterogeneity, 
unobserved fixed effects, measurement errors and endogeneity. Ahmed (1998) emphasizes the 
direction of causality and suggests that cross sectional studies are not capable of revealing the 
dynamic relationships necessary to establish causality.  In addition, neglect of reverse causality in 
either the cross sectional or time series modelling framework may introduce a simultaneity bias 
(Gujarati 1995; Shan & Sun 1998). Wachtel (2001) favors the use of dynamic panel data (panel 
VARs) for taking care of the simultaneity bias. Rapach (1998) emphasizes the stationarity of variables 
and notes that VAR should be estimated in a covariance stationary form. However, Naka and Tufta 
(1997) indicate that VAR is flexible enough and when two or more variables are cointegrated, VAR 
can be estimated in a vector error correction presentation. 
 
To explore the relative importance of the shock propagation mechanisms and due to   prevalence of 
different integration processes at work in each region, we employ a Panel Vector Autoregressive 
framework (PVEC) to find the direction of causality among the macroeconomic variables in the short 
and long term for each region. The direction of causality tells us about the transmission mechanisms. 
However, prior to using the PVEC, we also test for panel unit-roots and panel cointegration. First, we 
check the stationarity of the panel through panel stationarity techniques. If stationarity is not achieved 
at levels, then first differencing of the variables is done. After conducting panel stationarity tests, we 
apply the panel cointegration to find the long run relationship between goods exports, services exports 
and FDI with regional GDP. After finding evidence of the long run relationship as a result of the panel 
cointegration technique, we adopt the PVEC to find the direction of causality among the 
macroeconomic variables in the short and long term.  
 
4 Data 
 
Six regions namely the European Union (EU), Association for South East Asian Nation Plus three 
(ASEA+3), the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the North America Free 
Trade Area (NAFTA) and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) have been included in the 
analysis. In our study, the EU includes Turkey, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.  The ASEAN +3 is 
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comprises China, Hong Kong, South Korea, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and Japan. NAFTA 
has three members namely the United States, Canada and Mexico while seven countries namely India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Nepal and the Maldives have been included for analysis 
purposes. For our analysis, the MERCOSUR region comprises Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, 
Bolivia, Peru, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela. 
 
The data are collected from UNSTAT, UNCTAD Handbook 2008. The variables are defined in real 
values by deflating to 1990 prices using GDP deflators. The data cover the period 1980 to 2007. All 
variables are expressed in logs. For this study, 27 observations are sufficient time series to detect both 
the short- and long-run relationships of the FDI, goods exports, services exports and GDP growth. 
 
5 Results  
5.1 Unit Root Tests 
 
Examination of the time series properties of the data is an important step in the empirical analysis for 
correct specification in the model and to avoid the risk of spurious regression. The motivations cited 
for testing stationarity in panel data instead of single time series are:  the increase in power of the test 
with an increase in the number of cross sections, obtaining test statistics asymptotic normal 
distributions for generally encountered sample sizes and moments of asymptotic distributions are 
derived exactly without simulations (Hadri 2000). Campbell and Perron (1991) also highlight the 
limiting power of the unit root tests against the alternative of highly persistent deviations from 
equilibrium in the finite samples particularly small samples. In addition, due to a small time 
dimension of the most panels in empirical analysis, models with assumptions of homogeneous 
dynamics have been emphasized. However, with the recent shift of focus towards ‘pseudo panels’ 
with dynamic heterogeneous panels, the assumption of homogeneous dynamics has been questioned 
and inconsistency of pooled estimators has been demonstrated by Pesaren and Smith (1995), and 
Pesaren et al. (1996) (Im, Pesaren & Shin 2003).  
 
Different panel unit root tests have been proposed under varying assumptions. For example, Quah 
(1992, 1994) devised a panel root test based on the assumption that data are identically distributed 
across individuals and do not accommodate heterogeneity across groups such as individual fixed 
effects or different patterns of residual serial correlations (Im, Pesaren & Shin, 2003). Similarly 
Breitung and Meyer (1991) derived Dickey-Fuller test statistics with asymptotic normality based on 
large cross sections and small time dimensions as long as the pattern of serial correlation is identical 
across individuals but cannot be extended to panels with heterogeneous errors (Levin, Lin & Chu 
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2002). However the test proposed by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) allows for individual specific 
intercepts, time trends along with error variance and permitting patterns of higher order serial 
correlations to vary among individuals. The null hypothesis in this test considers each individual time 
series having a unit root against the alternative that each time series is stationary. The limitation of 
this test includes the assumption of cross sectional independence that does not take into account cross 
sectional correlation and all cross sections are identical with regard to the presence or absence of unit 
roots. Furthermore, this panel based unit root test is relevant for panels of moderate size such as 
individuals having more than 25 time series dimensions (Levin, Lin & Chu  2002). 
 
Instead of Levin, Lin and Chu’s (2002) assumption that all individuals are identical with respect to 
presence and absence of unit root; Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) propose an alternate testing procedure 
based on averaging of individual (augmented) Dickey-Fuller (1979) statistics computed for each 
group in the panel that has standard normal distribution so long as T>5. They also suggest more 
general test statistics where errors may be serially correlated with different serial correlation patterns 
across groups, panel with T and N dimensions sufficiently large and to unbalanced panels and 
dynamic panels with intercepts and trends. Unlike the test statistics discussed earlier, another test 
statistics proposed by Hadri is based on the null hypothesis of stationary against the alternative of 
having a unit root. This test statistic can be applied to panel data models with large T and moderate N 
with fixed effects, the individual deterministic trend and heterogeneous across cross sections but 
serially uncorrelated errors over time and can be widely used for Penn World Tables, having time 
series component that are nonstationary (Hadri  2000). 
 
There are five regions in this analysis, having different countries composition as well as cross 
sectional independence due to the presence of intra industry trade phenomenon. We identify the tests 
of Levin, Lin and Chu (2002); Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) and Hadri (2000) as the most relevant to 
analyze the stationarity time series property of regions panel data. Some of the panels may have 
missing observations. The time period ranges from 1980 to 2007 and can be analyzed under the above 
tests. The test results of all six regional panels for GDP, FDI, Goods exports and Services exports 
variables are given in Table 1(Appendix) that show stationarity in all variables after first differencing. 
 
5.2 Cointegration Tests 
 
 As modeling first differences alone ignores common trends, Granger discovered in 1983 that in 
certain situations, I (1) non stationary variables may have linear combination of I (0) which he called 
cointegrated variables. Furthermore, I (1) variables have an error correction mechanism (Engle & 
Granger 1987) that compels them to establish long run relationships. After that the cointegration 
testing techniques became widely used for finding the long run relationship among the I (1) variables. 
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After confirming that it is the span of data rather than frequency that matters for the power of tests 
(Perron 1989,1991; Pierse & Snell 1995), the risk of introducing regime changes by including long 
time series in data analysis forced  the alternative of bringing in similar additional cross sectional data 
for a common cointegration hypothesis instead of long time series. However, under these 
circumstances, the existing Johansen (1988, 1991) cointegration technique may be not useful and 
panel methods may be more practical (Pedroni 2004). In addition, in order to handle the issue of bias 
generated by regressors endogeneity, Kao (1999) devised a test under the null of no cointegration that 
adjusted for a bias term but both slope and short run dynamics were constrained to be homogeneous 
among panel members. However, true slopes vary across panels. 
 
For practical reasons, Pedroni (2004) proposed a residual based test statistics for the null of no 
cointegration that allowed for heterogeneity by having varying slope coefficients among members of 
the panels in addition to permitting for the regressors to be endogenous. Furthermore, allowance has 
been made for cointegrating vectors to be different among panel members. The test considers two 
classes of statistics; ‘within dimension of panel’ and ‘between dimensions of panel’. The former is 
based on pooling of regression residuals within the panel dimension while the later pools the 
regression residuals between the dimensions of the panel. To construct test statistics in both cases, the 
residuals are obtained from the cointegration equation of panel member as a first step. As a second 
step, various test statistics are constructed according to different ways of pooling of estimated 
residuals. For example, ‘panel-rho’ and ‘panel-variance ratio’ are  both semi parametric statistics  and 
the large negative value for panel-rho statistics and large positive  values for panel-v statistics indicate 
rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration under the test (Pedroni  2004). 
 
In order to find long run relationships among GDP, FDI, goods exports and services exports variables 
through the panel cointegration technique, we apply the Pedroni cointegration test (2004) for GDP, 
FDI, goods and services exports. The explanation is that these variables are endogenous and also the 
regional groupings comprising various countries permit consideration of heterogeneous slope among 
panel members. The panel cointegration test is conducted with and without deterministic 
heterogeneous trend. Out of seven panel cointegration statistics, the three summary statistics of the 
Pedroni (2004) cointegration test on six regions, namely; panel-v statistics, panel-ρ statistics and 
group-ρ statistics are reported in Table2 (Appendix). The test statistics for all regions show that there 
are very weak long run relationships among the variables in all regions as panel-v statistics are highly 
significant in all regions thus rejecting the null hypothesis of no cointegration when the test is 
conducted under allowing for heterogeneous intercept and deterministic trend.  
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5.3 Causality and Mechanisms Results 
 
After finding very weak long run relationships among GDP, FDI, goods exports and services exports 
under the Pedroni (2004) panel cointegration test, we find the mechanisms among variables as the 
causality may be running in one or all possible directions. Then, we can identify the relative 
importance of each transmission channel in each region because once identified, the same channels 
will serve as the shock propagation mechanism in times of the idiosyncratic crisis. From the panel unit 
root tests for each region in Table 1, we observe that each variable is non stationary at levels in most 
cases, but together weakly cointegrated, as we observed under the Pedroni panel cointegration test. 
Moreover, as already stated, the Granger representation theorem (Engle & Granger 1987) claims that  
I(1) variables have an error correction mechanism that forces them to establish a long run relationship. 
Furthermore, as we undertake our empirical analysis under the PVEC framework for different regions, 
we assume that region specific integration forces have transformed the region significantly during the 
liberalization process and marginal effects do not vary within each region’s panel. Therefore, we 
estimate our PVEC model under a fixed effect framework. Furthermore, for finding the relative 
importance of shock propagation mechanisms in the short and long run, we test for short- and long-
run causality in the panel vector error-correction mechanism (PVEC) model given as: 
 
 
∆yit =    αi + β eci,t-1 +  ∑pj=1 γ,j ∆yi,t-j  +  ∑pj=1 δ,j ∆xi,t-j + ε1it  (4) 
 
 
We analyze the impact of the macroeconomic variables in the short and long run along with direction 
of causality. First, we estimate the error correction mechanism from the cointegrating relationship ( ec
 
i,t-1= yit-1- αi - δi,jxi,t-1   ) then , we estimate the PVEC for each variable (Equation 1). In the  general 
PVEC model, the β
  
parameter captures the long-run dynamics in the system of equations for each 
variable (GDP, FDI, goods exports, services exports) which is distinct from the  δj   coefficients 
signifying the short run dynamics. 
 
To analyze the short term impact along with the causality of these variables on each other, the basic 
econometric framework requires estimation of four equations for each region (GDP, FDI, goods 
exports and services exports as dependent variables).  To assess the impact of each variable on the 
dependent variable in the short run, we employ the chi square Wald test on the joint significance of 
independent variables. For example, the short-run causality from xi to yi is given by the joint wald test 
of ∑pj=1 δ,j =0 . The estimation results have been reported in Table 3 ( Appendix). 
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The short run analysis shows that in MERCOSUR and SAARC only, the goods exports variable has a 
causal relationship with GDP growth while none of the trade variable (goods exports and services 
exports) influences GDP growth in other regions. More importantly, in the short run, there is 
empirical evidence of the long term financial flows channel ‘FDI’ causal relationship with GDP in the 
EU, MERCOSUR. However, in the ASEAN+3 and NAFTA, there is neither FDI nor trade variables 
short term causal relationship with GDP. National Income identity in equation 3 shows that four 
external channels namely long term FDI, short term foreign equity and creditors’ flows, goods and 
services exports influence economic growth. Therefore, knowing the relationships of three factors, 
any other unusual behaviour in GDP can be attributed to the fourth factor which is short term capital 
flows. Table 8 (Appendix) shows decline in the ASEAN and NAFTA GDP in 2008 and 2009 which is 
attributed to the short term capital flows and is justified in Table 7 (Appendix). In short, financial 
flows has short term causal relationship with GDP in the EU, the ASEAN+3, NAFTA and 
MERCOSUR. 
 
This general PVEC model(Equation 1), β
 
parameter captures the long-run dynamics in the system of 
equations for each variable (GDP, FDI, goods exports, services exports) The error term given by  β ec
 
i,t-1= β (yit-1- αi - δi,jxi,t-1 ) in the equation generates forces for attaining  long run equilibrium. Therefore 
in a cointegrated framework, at least one of the β parameter should be significant. The long run 
relationship is established by the joint significance of the error correction parameter and the 
parameters in the respective cointegrating vectors. The test results for establishing long run dynamics 
are reported in Table 4 (Appendix). The analysis shows that in the ASEAN+3 and the EU, trade 
variables (goods and services exports) and FDI have a long run causal relationship with GDP. 
However in the case of NAFTA and MERCOSUR, only goods exports affect GDP in the long run 
while in SAARC it is  services exports. More importantly, the numbers of relationships are more in 
the regions where an intra industry trade phenomenon is pronounced such as in the ASEAN+3 and the 
EU. 
 
 As we try to analyze the impact of the financial crisis on regions, the transmission mechanisms in the 
short run are more significant from the policy perspective. Our empirical analysis demonstrates that 
any idiosyncratic shock transmitted through goods exports will affect GDP growth in MERCOSUR 
and SAARC only while the rest of the regions will exhibit the decoupling phenomenon. On the other 
hand, the shocks transmitted through the long term financial flows channel ‘FDI’ will affect the GDP 
of EU, ASEAN+3, MERCOSUR and NAFTA. SAARC seems to be insulated from long term 
financial flow shocks. Additionally, the  transmission variable  impact level on each region’s GDP 
will depend on the level of each region’s exposure in the shock transmitting variable to the shock 
originating country as well as the spillover effects coming from other regions. For example if the 
negative shock originated in the financial sector in the US, it will affect  other regions GDP that 
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exhibit the short term causal relationship between the financial channel such as FDI with GDP and 
spillover effects generated by the dampening of the other regions outputs. Figure 1 (Appendix) 
illustrates the level of each region’s goods exports exposure to the US. 
 
 6 Discussion 
 
We claim that business cycles convergence or the decoupling phenomena in regions subject to 
idiosyncratic disturbances depend on the relative importance of the shock propagation mechanisms in 
regions and whether the shock is transmitted through trade or financial variables. The response of 
each region may be different depending on the integration forces at work in each region. In addition, 
country wise responses may be different from regions responses as these depend on the type of 
integration forces at work and the position of the country on the intra industry trade ladder. So while 
observing regions responses to two shocks (subprime mortgage crisis, fall of Lehman brothers), two 
considerations have to keep in mind. First, in order to answer our question, we focus on short run 
dynamics due to the short duration between the two shocks. Second, we find the impact of short term 
capital flows by relying on national income identity and for long term capital flows by considering 
FDI causal relationship with other macroeconomic variables in a PVEC framework. Both short term 
and long term capital flows will convey information about financial shock transmission mechanisms 
in each region.  
 
Without any ambiguity, integration forces have changed the regional dynamics especially the EU and 
the ASEAN+3 (Figure 1, Appendix). Since 2000, except for the NAFTA and MERCOSUR, 
intraregional trade has increased in other regions. There has been significant progress in the 
ASEAN+3 where with the entry of China to the WTO in 2001, its intraregional goods trade grew to 
48.5 per cent compared to 42.5 per cent. In the EU, the level of intraregional trade stands almost the 
same at 68 per cent of total trade. The other major development is that except for MERCOSUR, all 
regions have lessened their exposure to the US market compared to 2000. So except for MERCOSUR 
and SAARC, intraregional trade is the dominant phenomenon. 
 
We know that two shocks occurred, one in the latter part of 2007 during the subprime mortgage crisis 
(falling US housing prices) and the second in September 2008 with the fall of Lehman Brothers.  
Table 5 (Appendix) shows that the shock that originated due to the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007 
was idiosyncratic in nature because it originated in the US. As a result, the fall in US real GDP and 
domestic demand was considerable compared to the advanced economies and Euro area. As 
highlighted in Table 6 (Appendix), despite the contraction of global trade volumes, the US slowdown 
did not significantly affect advanced countries or emerging and developing countries exports. 
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Furthermore, positive terms of trade were observed in 2007. Our empirical analysis demonstrates that 
in the short run, goods exports will affect the regions GDP only in MERCOSUR and SAARC and that 
too depends on the level of exposure to the crisis country. In the case of the US, MERCOSUR and 
SAARC export goods not more that 20 per cent as shown in Figure 1(Appendix).   
 
The other transmission mechanism that could affect the regions GDP is the financial transmission 
mechanism. Table 7 (Appendix) shows that both short term and long term capital flows in absolute 
terms have increased in the major groupings around the world. Overall, except NAFTA, all major 
regions experienced modest growth in 2007 as shown in Table 8 (Appendix) because negative shock 
came through the fall in goods exports to the US that could affect only MERCOSUR and SAARC 
regions GDP in the short run. However, given the low level of exposure of these regions to the US 
economy in goods exports, these regions maintained modest growth in 2007. Therefore, the level of 
co movements of the business cycles of the regions with the US in 2007 was very low and some 
regions exhibited the decoupling phenomenon.  
 
However, the story is different in 2008 when the second idiosyncratic shock originated with the fall of 
Lehman Brothers. The shock originated in the financial sector in the US that triggered the sharp 
reversal of financial flows from each region as shown in Table 7 (Appendix). However, Private Direct 
Investment showed laggard reversal movements due to its long term nature compared to other 
financial flows in 2008, but again joined the momentum with other financial flows in 2009. Our 
empirical analysis illustrates, the reversal of financial flows could affect negatively the regions GDP 
in the case of the EU, ASEAN+3, NAFTA and MERCOSUR. As can be seen in Table 5 (Appendix), 
the advanced economies, the US and the Euro Area saw a dramatic decline in their real GDP and 
domestic demand in 2008. The situation deteriorated in 2009. As a result, advanced economies and 
emerging and developing economies experienced a sharp fall in trade flows in 2008 and 2009 as 
Table 6 shows. As observed before, the goods exports variable shock transmission mechanism affects 
only SAARC and MERCOSUR GDP in the short run. Therefore in MERCOSUR, in addition to the 
goods exports variable, the financial flows variable also has short term causal relationship with GDP 
due to which MERCOSUR can be severely affected. Table 8 (Appendix) demonstrates that all regions 
GDP slowed in 2008 and worsened in 2009 when all types of financial flows were exhibiting reversal 
signs in unison. Therefore, in 2008, when the shock originated in the financial sector, most regions 
exhibited co movements of the business cycles highlighting the relative importance of the shock 
propagation mechanism and the nature of origin. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
The world has changed considerably in the last two decades. Economies have integrated regionally 
and globally. The major regions such as the EU, ASEAN+3 and NAFTA are now trading more intra 
regionally than inter regionally while this is not the case for MERCOSUR and SAARC. The primary 
reason for the former countries trading more with each other is the presence of the intra industry trade 
phenomenon. Therefore, the response of each region to any idiosyncratic shock such as the current 
global financial crisis will be different and will depend on the special characteristics of the region and 
the transmission mechanism through which the shock is propagated. Trade and financial integration 
have been identified as the two most important idiosyncratic shock propagating mechanisms. 
Therefore, each region’s business cycle co-movement will depend on the type of linkage with the 
idiosyncratic shock origin country. 
 
We find that the global financial crisis which started in 2007 was due to idiosyncratic shocks 
generated in the US because of the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis (falling US housing prices). The 
shock originated in the real sector and was transmitted through trade variables. Empirically, only 
MERCOSUR and SAARC regions GDP has a causal short term relationship with goods exports and 
any negative goods exports shock affects only these two regions GDP and that too  depends on the 
level of exposure to the shock originating country. Due to the limited goods exports exposure of these 
regions to the US, these regions may exhibit the decoupling phenomenon to the subprime mortgage 
crisis shock Furthermore, due to the absence of the causal short term relationship between goods 
exports and GDP; the other regions may demonstrate decoupling with the US business cycle. On the 
other hand, the shock generated with the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 was different in 
nature and was transmitted through financial variables. The empirical analysis shows that in the EU, 
ASEAN+3, NAFTA and MERCOSUR, the financial variable has a short term causal relationship with 
regions GDP. As the reversal of financial flows took place with the fall of Lehman Brothers, most 
regions showed business cycles synchronization with the US business cycle. In the EU, ASEAN+3, 
NAFTA and MERCOSUR, GDP has the short term causal relationship with financial variable and any 
reversal in financial flows could affect the regions GDP negatively. The resultant negative growth in 
GDP in these regions could again trigger the goods exports shock transmission mechanism and could 
negatively affect GDP growth in SAARC and MERCOSUR. Therefore, due to the 2008 crisis, we 
could experience convergence in business cycles of the major regions in contrast to the 2007 shock.  
 
Decoupling and convergence in business cycles depends not only on the origin of the idiosyncratic 
shocks, whether originates in the real sector or financial sector, but also on the transmission 
mechanisms through which shocks are transmitted. Knowing the relative importance of the shocks 
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propagating mechanisms has important policy implications not only in the form of timely devising  
the policy to stave off  recessionary impacts but also in  strengthening the buffers  to insulate  regions 
from future idiosyncratic shocks.  Due to the integration process in the regions, the importance of 
trade channels in transmitting idiosyncratic shocks from the major economies such as US has 
lessened. On the other hand, the recent shock has reemphasized financial variables as the most 
significant channels for idiosyncratic shock transmissions. Knowing the correct transmission 
mechanism will help in tailoring an appropriate response to the idiosyncratic disturbance and is 
helpful in achieving the long term regional development goals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22
Appendix 
 
 
Table 1 panel unit root tests 
 
Gross Domestic Product  (GDP)  
 Level Ist  Difference 
Individual 
intercept 
Individual 
intercept 
and trend 
Individual 
intercept 
Individual 
intercept 
and trend 
European Union Null:  Unit Root 
 
 
Null: Stationary 
Levin, Lin, Chin (t stat) 2.15 -2.16** -7.2*** -3.63*** 
Im, Pesaren and Shin 
W-Stat 
8.25 -2.04** -8.9*** -5.39*** 
Hadri 15.21*** 8.02*** 3.85*** 4.5*** 
ASEAN +3 Null:  Unit Root 
 
 
Null: Stationary 
Levin, Lin, Chin (t stat) 0.72 1.37 -7.49*** -6.7*** 
Im, Pesaren and Shin 
W-Stat 
4.92  2.09 -8.16*** -8.38*** 
Hadri 12.02*** 8.07*** 3.86*** 1.87** 
NAFTA Null:  Unit Root 
 
 
Null: Stationary 
Levin, Lin, Chin (t stat) 0.42 0.52 -6.61*** -6.2*** 
Im, Pesaren and Shin 
W-Stat 
3.08 -1.8** -5.4*** -4.65*** 
Hadri 5.8*** 2.7** -0.36 0.97 
MERCOSUR Null:  Unit Root 
 
 
Null: Stationary 
Levin, Lin, Chin (t stat) 4.6 -1.32 -5.5*** -3.95*** 
Im, Pesaren and Shin 
W-Stat 
7.02 -3.1** -6.37*** -5.27*** 
Hadri 9.5*** 4.1*** 0.92 0.92 
SAARC Null:  Unit Root 
 
 
Null: Stationary 
Levin, Lin, Chin (t stat) 3.67 1.91 -3.53** -3.62*** 
Im, Pesaren and Shin 
W-Stat 
6.01 3.18 -3.45** -4.89*** 
Hadri 9*** 4.53*** 0.96 0.9 
Foreign Direct Investment(FDI) 
European Union Null:  Unit Root 
 
 
Null: Stationary 
Levin, Lin, Chin (t stat) -2.2** -5.11*** -18.87*** -13.76*** 
Im, Pesaren and Shin 
W-Stat 
-1.13 -3.9*** -17.3*** -11.76*** 
Hadri 14.4*** 6.82*** 1.65** 4.45*** 
ASEAN +3 Null:  Unit Root 
 
 
Null: Stationary 
Levin, Lin, Chin (t stat) -1.63* 3.28 -14.89*** -9.63*** 
Im, Pesaren and Shin 
W-Stat 
-0.74 -1.33* -15.17*** -11.55*** 
Hadri 10.87*** 6.31*** -0.75 0.94 
NAFTA Null:  Unit Root 
 
 
Null: Stationary 
Levin, Lin, Chin (t stat) -1.1 -2.13** -6.9*** -6.08*** 
Im, Pesaren and Shin 
W-Stat 
-0.1 -2.3** -6.91*** -5.74*** 
Hadri 5.31*** 0.35 -0.17 2.88** 
MERCOSUR Null:  Unit Root 
 
 
Null: Stationary 
Levin, Lin, Chin (t stat) -1.98** -1.11 -8.11*** -6.39*** 
Im, Pesaren and Shin 
W-Stat 
-0.21 -1.42* -10.05*** --6.58*** 
Hadri 7.38*** 3.18*** 1.23 5.73*** 
SAARC Null:  Unit Root 
 
 
Null: Stationary 
Levin, Lin, Chin (t stat) -0.72 -2.85** -9.65*** -11.44*** 
Im, Pesaren and Shin 
W-Stat 
0.26 -2.53** -8.39*** -5.77*** 
Hadri 6.56*** 4.37*** 4.17*** 15.64*** 
Goods Exports  
European Union Null:  Unit Root 
 
 
Null: Stationary 
Levin, Lin, Chin (t stat) 1.3 -5.69** -16.65*** -16.35*** 
Im, Pesaren and Shin 
W-Stat 
5.2 -1.98** -13.61*** -7.67*** 
Hadri 14.01*** 7.84*** 2.11** 4.77*** 
ASEAN +3 Null:  Unit Root 
 
 
Null: Stationary 
Levin, Lin, Chin (t stat) 1.31 -0.61 -13.34*** -11.71*** 
Im, Pesaren and Shin 
W-Stat 
6.14 -0.58 -13.06*** -10.69*** 
Hadri 11.64*** 5.98*** 1.33* 6.08*** 
NAFTA Null:  Unit Root 
 
 
Null: Stationary 
Levin, Lin, Chin (t stat) 0.2 -0.5 -4.8*** -4.26*** 
Im, Pesaren and Shin 
W-Stat 
1.18 -1.55* -3.56*** -2.46*** 
Hadri 5.47*** 0.52 -0.67 0.66 
MERCOSUR Null:  Unit Root 
 
 
Null: Stationary 
Levin, Lin, Chin (t stat) 2.61 -0.82 -12.42*** -9.42*** 
Im, Pesaren and Shin 
W-Stat 
3.85 0.17 -11.9*** -10.08*** 
Hadri 7.43*** 6.38*** 2.67** 1.5* 
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SAARC Null:  Unit Root 
 
 
Null: Stationary 
Levin, Lin, Chin (t stat) 0.75 0.1 -10.84*** -9.4*** 
Im, Pesaren and Shin 
W-Stat 
3.09 -1.17 -10.64*** -9.32*** 
Hadri 8.68*** 3.87*** 0.07 2.71** 
Services Exports 
European Union Null:  Unit Root 
 
 
Null: Stationary 
Levin, Lin, Chin (t stat) 2.97 -2.66** -15.82*** -14.69*** 
Im, Pesaren and Shin 
W-Stat 
5.34 -1.64** -13.93*** -8.96*** 
Hadri 14.95*** 10.28*** 5.35*** 5.47*** 
ASEAN +3 Null:  Unit Root 
 
 
Null: Stationary 
Levin, Lin, Chin (t stat) -1.23 -1.7** -10.38*** -7.94*** 
Im, Pesaren and Shin 
W-Stat 
2.68 -0.46 -10.06*** -8.06*** 
Hadri 10.87*** 5.52*** 0.89 3.38* 
NAFTA Null:  Unit Root 
 
 
Null: Stationary 
Levin, Lin, Chin (t stat) -1.97** 0.71 -3.24** -1.48** 
Im, Pesaren and Shin 
W-Stat 
-1.04 1.02 -3.86** -3.2*** 
Hadri 5.43*** 3.12** 0.2 1.73** 
MERCOSUR Null:  Unit Root 
 
 
Null: Stationary 
Levin, Lin, Chin (t stat) -0.5 -1.88** -14.05*** -12.2*** 
Im, Pesaren and Shin 
W-Stat 
0.89 -1.21 -12.13*** -10.96*** 
Hadri 7.34*** 6.35*** 1.82** 1.7** 
SAARC Null:  Unit Root 
 
 
Null: Stationary 
Levin, Lin, Chin (t stat) 2.96 -0.44 -9.27*** -7.89*** 
Im, Pesaren and Shin 
W-Stat 
3.79 -0.96 -8.24*** -4.6*** 
Hadri 8*** 4.53*** 1.74** 3.55*** 
Note: *, **, *** represent significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Also high autocorrelation leads to severe size 
distortion in Hadri test leading to over-rejection of null. 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
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Table 2 Results of panel cointegration 
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration  (Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test) 
 Heterogeneous 
intercept 
Heterogeneous intercept  and  
Trend 
Panel 
v-stat 
Panel 
ρ-stat 
Group 
ρ-stat 
Panel  
v-stat 
Panel 
ρ-stat 
Group 
ρ-stat 
European Union -0.26 2.87 5.18 5.41*** 6.09 7.04 
ASEAN +3 -0.28 3.24 4.39 7.24*** 4.83 5.67 
NAFTA -0.36 1.24 2.31 8.59*** 0.73 1.29 
MERCOSUR 0.27 0.74 2.12 2.1** 2.33 3.2 
SAARC 1.27 1.94 3.27 20.93*** 3.04 4.06 
Note: *, **, *** represent significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Short run dynamics 
 
European 
Union 
ASEAN+3 NAFTA MERCOSUR SAARC 
GDP as dependant  variable 
∆FDI→∆GDP 0.002* 0.002 -0.005 0.01** 0 
∆X goods →∆GDP 0.006 -0.01 0.06 0.04** 0.03** 
∆X services →∆GDP -0.003 -0.001 -0.09 0 -0.02 
FDI as dependent variable 
∆GDP→∆FDI -1.22 -0.77 2.69 0.56 4.11 
∆X goods →∆FDI -0.02 0.24 1.03 0.24 -0.54 
∆X services →∆FDI 0.35 -0.004 -3.82 0.19 -0.61 
Goods exports as dependent variable 
∆GDP→ ∆X goods 0.85** 0.09 0.3 -0.21 -0.42 
∆FDI → ∆X goods -0.01** -0.03** 0.05** -0.03**   0 
∆X services → ∆X 
goods 
0.03 -0.01 -0.53 0.07 -0.07 
Services exports as dependent variable 
∆GDP → ∆X 
services 
0.16 -0.76 -0.27 0.37 -0.33 
∆FDI → ∆X services -0.01 -0.02 0.03** -0.02 0 
∆X goods → ∆X 
services 
0.26** -0.08 0.22 -0.11 -0.02 
Note: *, **, *** represent significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
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Table 4  Long run dynamics among variables 
 
European 
Union 
ASEAN+3 NAFTA MERCOSUR SAARC 
GDP as dependant  variable 
Error Correction 
Term (ecit-1) 
-0.99*** -0.07*** -0.32** -0.11** -0.09** 
FDI→GDP -0.009*** -0.01** 0.005 0.001 -0.01 
X goods →GDP 0.19*** 0.3*** -0.09** 0.13** 0.006 
X services →GDP 0.13*** 0.09* 0.007 0.06 0.16** 
FDI as dependent variable 
Error Correction 
Term (ecit-1) 
-0.09 -0.44*** -1.04 -0.18 -0.92 
GDP→FDI -1.67** -0.95* 1.38 0.12 -1.48** 
X goods →FDI 0.6** 0.39 0.1 0.03 2.92*** 
X services →FDI 0.9*** 0.68** 0.33 -0.01 0.49* 
Goods exports as dependent variable 
Error Correction 
Term (ecit-1) 
0.147 0.55 0.08 0.04 -0.19 
GDP→ X goods 1.13*** 1.14*** -2** 0.78** 0.02 
FDI → X goods 0.02** 0.02 0.008 0.002 0.01*** 
X services → X 
goods 
0.1** 0.14** -0.21 0.51*** 0.2** 
Services exports as dependent variable 
Error Correction 
Term (ecit-1) 
0.49*** 0.03** 0.19 0.08 0.5 
GDP → X services 1.31*** 0.79** 0.25 0.43 1.22*** 
FDI → X services 0.05*** 0.11** 0.04 0 0.03 
X goods → X 
services 
0.17** 0.32** -0.37 0.61*** 0.37** 
Note: *, **, *** represent significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
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Table 5 Gross domestic product (GDP), domestic demand and private expenditure, (real, 
per cent change) 
 Annual Fourth Quarter 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2008 2009 
Real GDP 
 
Advanced 
Economies 
3 2.7 0.9 -3.8 -1.7 -2.6 
United States 2.8 2 1.1 -2.8 -0.8 -2.2 
Euro Area 2.9 2.7 0.9 -4.2 -1.4 -3.5 
Domestic Demand 
 
Advanced 
Economies 
2.8 2.3 0.4 -3.3 -1.6 -2.4 
United States 2.6 1.4 -0.3 -3.3 -1.9 -2.3 
Euro Area 2.8 2.4 0.9 -2.9 -0.1 -3.2 
Source: World Economic Outlook (WEO, April 2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 Summary of trade in goods and services 
 (volumes, annual per cent change) 
  Trade Exports Imports Terms of 
Trade 
World 2006 9.2 - - - 
2007 7.2 - - - 
2008 3.3 - - - 
2009 -11 - - - 
Advanced 
Countries 
2006 - 8.5 7.6 -1.1 
2007 - 6.1 4.7 0.4 
2008 - 1.8 0.4 -2 
2009 - -13.5 -12.1 1.5 
Emerging 
and 
Developing 
Countries 
2006 - 10.9 13.2 4.1 
2007 - 9.5 14 1.2 
2008 - 6 10.9 4.4 
2009 - -6.4 -8.8 -8 
Source: World Economic Outlook (WEO, April, 2009). 
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Table 7 Emerging and developing economies (US$ billions) 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 
Emerging and 
Developing 
Economies 
Private Direct 
Investment, net 
241.4 359 459.3 312.8 
Private Portfolio 
Flows, net 
-100.7 39.5 -155.2 -234.5 
Other Private 
Capital Flows, net 
62.2 219.2 -194.6 -268.5 
Central and 
Eastern Europe 
Private Direct 
Investment, net 
58.9 72 64.1 30.1 
Private Portfolio 
Flows, net 
9.4 -7.4 -13.2 -6.1 
Other Private 
Capital Flows, net 
51.7 108.9 96.2 -62.2 
Emerging Asia 
including Newly 
Industrialized 
Asian Economies 
Private Direct 
Investment, net 
20.7 138.5 222.6 161.6 
Private Portfolio 
Flows, net 
12.9 11.2 -65.9 -192.1 
Other Private 
Capital Flows, net 
21.5 15.2 -28.7 -16.3 
Source: World Economic Outlook (WEO, April, 2009). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 8 Regions gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates (annual per cent change), 
constant prices (national currency)  
Region 2007 2008 2009 Countries showing 
negative growth 
rates in 2008 
EU 4.13 1.58 -4.3 Denmark, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, 
Sweden 
ASEAN+3 7.47 4.25 0.3 Japan 
NAFTA 2.67 0.73 -4.18 NA 
MERCOSUR 6.97 5.89 -0.75 NA 
SAARC 6.42 5.64 3.45 NA 
Source: World Economic Outlook (WEO, October, 2009) and 
author’s calculations (Direction of Trade, IMF). 
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Figure 1 Share of export   to intra region and the US (per cent of total exports) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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